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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, an estimated 984,000 children in the United States were
victims of some form of abuse.' Approximately 103,845 of these chil-
dren were sexually abused.2 Five to fifteen percent of all males and
fifteen to thirty percent of all females report some type of exposure to
child sexual abuse.3 Based on reports to law enforcement, children
under twelve constituted roughly fifty percent of all victims of forcible
sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or forcible fondling.4
Child sexual abuse cases are difficult to prosecute because the
1. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Children's Bureau (2000),
http://www.nvc.org/stats/ca-csa.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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young child and the abuser are usually the only witnesses to the crime.
Physical evidence of child sexual abuse is problematic to collect
because, for example, fondling does not leave physical proof behind like
sexual intercourse may. 5 In some cases, the child cannot testify because
the child is found to be incompetent, or the child is too frightened to
testify because the person being accused is a family member. Conse-
quently, the evidence available to prosecutors in these cases is usually
statements made by the child to family members, law enforcement, or
medical personnel. Because these out-of-court statements made by the
child are considered hearsay, they must be admitted under an exception
to the hearsay rule. The reason for admitting hearsay under an exception
is that a statement may be so inherently reliable that it can be accepted
as true.6
Many state and federal courts admit statements made to medical
personnel by sexually abused children detailing the sexual abuse and
identifying the abuser under a medical diagnosis hearsay exception.7
These courts have found that statements made by children to medical
personnel are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment because
knowing the identity of the abuser and the nature of the abuse allows the
doctor to diagnose and treat the child physically, mentally, and emotion-
ally.8 This diagnosis and treatment is critical in child sexual abuse cases
because the abuser may be living in the same household and/or may be a
family member. Because the child is helpless against this abuse, the
immediate concern of medical personnel is to remove the child from this
environment to prevent future abuse. For example, in United States v.
Renville the Eighth Circuit determined that the treating physcian has the
immediate obligation of removing the child from the abusive
environment. 9
Florida does not permit hearsay statements identifying the abuser in
child sexual abuse cases to be admitted under Florida's medical diagno-
sis hearsay exception,' ° section 90.803(4), Florida Statutes." In 1993,
5. See Corpus v. State, 718 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
6. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
7. See State v. Crumbley, 519 S.E.2d 94, 97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Meeboer, 484
N.W.2d 621, 626 (Mich. 1992); United States v. Pacheco, 154 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
8. See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985).
9. Id.
10. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 824 (Fla. 1993).
11. FLA. STAT. § 90. 803(4) (2000) states:
Statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a person
seeking the diagnosis or treatment, or made by an individual who has knowledge of
the facts and is legally responsible for the person who is unable to communicate the
facts, which statements describe the medical history, past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inceptions or general character of the cause or external
source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
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the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Jones tried to resolve a conflict in
Florida law regarding admissibility of statements of the identity of the
abuser in child sexual abuse cases under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception. Refusing to follow other states, the Florida Supreme Court
announced that out-of-court statements made by sexually abused chil-
dren to a doctor identifying their abuser would be controlled by Flor-
ida's child abuse exception to the hearsay rule,1 2 section 90.803(23),
Florida Statutes. '
3
This Comment discusses whether the Florida Supreme Court suc-
ceeded in balancing the rights of the accused against the need to protect
sexually abused children by only allowing identity statements to be
admitted under the child abuse hearsay exception. Section II of this
comment will discuss the admission of identity statements made by
child sexual abuse victims under section 90.803(4), the medical diagno-
sis hearsay exception, before the adoption of section 90.803(23), the
child abuse hearsay exception, and how other states admit a child's
statement of identity through their medical diagnosis hearsay exception.
Section III will discuss the admission of children's statements under sec-
tion 90.803(23) and how other states not only admit a child's statement
through their child abuse hearsay exception, but also through their medi-
cal diagnosis hearsay exception. Section IV will examine how federal
courts admit identity statements made by sexually abused children.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the Florida Supreme Court elimi-
nated a valuable alternative in child sexual abuse prosecutions when it
declared that a child's statement to a physician as to the identity of a
perpetrator of sexual abuse is not admissible under section 90.803(4),
the medical diagnosis hearsay exception.
II. FLORIDA'S MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS HEARSAY ExCEPTION
According to the Florida Evidence Code, "'Hearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 4 The
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants an accused
the right to confront and cross-examine "the witnesses against him."' 5
Therefore, hearsay statements are inadmissible because there is no way
to test the reliability of these statements if the declarant cannot be cross-
examined.
Id.
12. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 824.
13. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23).
14. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c)
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In order for a declarant's out-of-court statements to be admitted in
court, the declarant must be under oath, in the presence of the trier of
fact so that credibility may be examined, and subject to cross-examina-
tion. Nevertheless, a hearsay statement may be admitted if it falls within
a designated exception to the hearsay rule. Exceptions to the hearsay
rule ensure and provide necessary guarantees of trustworthiness. There-
fore, an examination under the Confrontation Clause is no longer
required if the statement falls within an exception.' 6
In Florida, in order for hearsay statements to fall under the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception, it must be shown that: (1) the statements
were made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment; and (2) the declar-
ant knew that the statements were made for a medical purpose. 7 The
rationale behind the medical diagnosis hearsay exception in Florida is
that a patient seeking treatment is motivated to make truthful statements
disclosing to the doctor what the patient believes is pertinent to diagno-
sis. 8 Because the patient knows that the doctor will rely on her state-
ments in formulating a treatment, these statements are inherently
trustworthy as a patient is less apt to lie to the doctor who she believes is
going to restore her back to health. As Judge Learned Hand wrote,
A man goes to his physician expecting to recount all that he feels, and
often has with some care searched his consciousness to be sure that
he will leave out nothing. If his narrative of present symptoms is to
be received as evidence of the facts, as distinguished from mere sup-
port for the physician's opinion, these parts if it can only rest upon
his motive to disclose the truth because his treatment will in part
depend on what he says.' 9
A. United States v. Renville
The federal counterpart to Florida's section 90.803(4) is Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(4).20 United States v. Renville, the leading federal
case, adopted by most state courts, found that the identification by an
16. See Robert R. Rugani, Jr., The Gradual Decline of a Hearsay Exception: The
Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), The Medical Diagnosis Hearsay Exception,
39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867, 875-78 (1999).
17. Begley v. State, 483 So. 2d 70, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
18. Otis Elevator Co. v. Youngerrman, 636 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
19. Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
20. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: ... (4) Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonable pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
[Vol. 55:533
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eleven-year-old child of the stepfather as the abuser admissible under
Rule 803(4) because it was reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis
or treatment of the emotional and psychological injuries of a child and to
prevent reoccurrence of the injury.21 The Renville court emphasized that
the case of a sexually abused child presents a special situation22 and
premised its decision on the fact that when an abuser lives in the same
household of the child, the child will never be safe until he is taken out
of this environment.2 3 Renville further noted that physicians have an
obligation to prevent "an abused child from being returned to an envi-
ronment in which he or she cannot be adequately protected from recur-
rent abuse."' 24 Furthermore, to adequately treat these emotional and
psychological injuries, the physician will often times need to ascertain
the identity of the abuser. "Information that the abuser is a member of
the household is therefore 'reasonably pertinent' to a course of treatment
which includes removing the child from the home. 25 Many other fed-
eral courts have agreed.26
The Renville court used a two-fold analysis established by the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Iron Shell, an earlier case, to analyze
whether a statement made by a sexually abused child can be admitted
under Rule 803(4). The court held: (1) the declarant's motive in mak-
ing the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting
treatment; and (2) the content of the statement must be the type reasona-
bly relied upon by a physician in treatment or diagnosis. In order to
satisfy the Iron Shell analysis, the physician must make clear to the child
victim that the identity of the abuser is important to the treatment of the
victim and the victim must understand the purpose of the visit with the
physician.2 8
When dealing with sexually abused children, the nature and extent
of the necessary emotional and psychological treatment, along with the
physical treatment, will depend on the abuser's indentity when he or she
is a member of the child's immediate household.29 If the abuser is part
of the immediate household, then this information is reasonably perti-
nent to medical diagnosis because it will aid the doctor in identifying not
21. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985).
22. Id. at 437.
23. Id. at 438.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1493-95 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Belfany, 965
F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1992); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F. 2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988).
27. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436 (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th
Cir. 1980)).
28. Id. at 438.
29. Id. at 437.
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only what is wrong with the child and how to treat the child, but also
identifying the type of psychological treatment the child must receive
after the abuse and if removal of the child from the home environment is
necessary in order to prevent future abuse. Once the Renville/Iron Shell
test is met, the statements are admissible because the motive to tell the
truth has been established.
B. Flanagan v. State
In 1991, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida in Flanagan
v. State3" followed the trend among state and federal courts in adopting
Renville by affirming the admission of the identity of an abuser in a
child sexual abuse case under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
where the abuser was an immediate member of the family or house-
hold.3 The defendant in Flanagan argued that testimony of fault and
identity are inadmissible hearsay under section 90.803(4) because it is
not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of the child when
examined by the doctor.32 The court held the statement made by a nine-
year-old child to a pediatrician with the Tallahassee Child Protection
Team identifying her father as the abuser was admissible because, "the
rationale for such admission is that, within the context of incidents of
child sexual abuse occurring in the home, for treatment purposes state-
ments of identification are inseparable from other statements regarding
the incident.' 33 The court found that since little difference existed
between the federal medical diagnosis hearsay exception and the Florida
medical diagnosis hearsay exception, this indicated that the Florida rule
should be construed in accordance with federal cases interpreting the
federal rule.34
C. State v. Jones
Before State v. Jones, there had been controversy within the state
district courts of appeal in Florida as to whether a child's out of court
statement identifying the abuser in a sexual abuse case was admissible
under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception. In the 1993 case of
State v. Jones, the Florida Supreme Court examined the holding in
Flanagan v. State and faced the question of whether to accept or reject
the majority of state and federal courts, which had found that statements
30. Flanagan v State, 586 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
31. Id. at 1093.
32. Id. at 1092.
33. Id. at 1093 (citing Michael C. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule and
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 529
(1988)).
34. Id. at 1094.
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of identity made to medical personnel by victims of child sexual abuse
were admissible under statutes similar to section 90.803(4)."5 In Jones,
the doctor examined the eight-year-old victim and found that she had
gonorrhea. So he "asked her if anyone had 'messed with' her," and she
answered that "Johnny" had.36 Another member of the child protective
team conducted an examination and found signs of sexual activity.
When she asked the child about it, the child replied that Johnny Jones
had sex with her.3 7 The doctors' testimony was admitted by the trial
court as statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis under
section 90.803(4). The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's decision because the court found the doctors' testimony inadmis-
sible, due to the fact that the doctors were part of an investigative team
and, as part of that team, they were investigating if sexual abuse had
been committed and by whom, thus not helping to diagnose or treat the
child.38
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appeallate court and held
that the statements made by the child to the pediatrician identifying the
sexual abuser are inadmissible under Florida's medical diagnosis hear-
say exception. 39 The court discussed the Renville and Flanagan cases
and rejected their reasoning because the rationale behind the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception is that a patient has a motivation to tell the
truth when visiting the doctor, and this motive is not present in cases
dealing with children.40 The court stated that when dealing with state-
ments of fault in which severe consequences may come from the accusa-
tions, the ability to tell the truth may be influenced by a temptation to
alter the result.4 Therefore, statements made by children are not inher-
ently reliable. 2
Due to the problems perceived by the Florida Supreme Court in
applying the medical diagnosis hearsay exception in child sexual abuse
cases, the court announced that the proper examination of a child's out-
of-court statement falls under section 90.803(23). 43 The Jones court
stated that the child abuse hearsay exception is a superior procedure in
which to test the reliability of a child's hearsay statement because it
contains foundational requirements, such as conducting a hearing out of
35. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 825.
41. Id. (quoting Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666 (Md. 1988)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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the jury's presence, and a notice requirement to protect the accused's
confrontation rights.' Moreover, the court stated that even under the
Renville test, the child's statements would have been inadmissible
because the doctors did not make clear to the child that the identity of
the abuser would help with diagnosis or treatment, and the child showed
no signs of understanding this to be true.4 5 Despite these pronounce-
ments, the court found that the physicians' statements were admissible
because they were prior consistent statements made by the child used to
rebut charges of recent fabrication and improper influence under section
90.801(2)(b), Florida Statutes.46
D. Admissibility of Identification Statements in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases Under Other States' Medical Diagnosis Hearsay Exceptions.
Most states admit statements of identity in child sexual abuse cases
under their medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions. Some states have even
fashioned rules to guide examination of these statements to determine if
they are reliable. For example, North Carolina courts established factors
to be considered when dealing with hearsay statements of identification
in child sexual abuse cases under their medical diagnosis hearsay excep-
tion.47 These factors are:
(i) whether the examination was requested by persons involved in the
prosecution of the case, (ii) the proximity of the examination to the
victim's initial diagnosis, (iii) whether the victim received a diagnosis
or treatment as a result of the examination, and (iv) the proximity of
the examination to the trial date.48
In State v. Crumbley, a seven-year-old child who was sexually
abused by her mom's live-in boyfriend spoke with two investigators
from Social Services after the incident.49 The court found the statements
made to the first investigator were admissible because the investigator
did not interview the child at the request of prosecutors, but rather she
interviewed the child according to her duty as an emergency investigator
for Social Services.50 The court also considered the following facts: (1)
the interview took place twenty months before trial; (2) the interview
was eight days before the child's initial diagnosis and treatment; and (3)
the interview also allowed the child to be removed from the abusive
44. Id. at 826.
45. Id. at 826 n. 12.
46. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (2000).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (1999).
48. State v. Crumbley, 519 S.E.2d 94, 97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Jones, 367
S.E.2d 139, 144 (N.C. 1988)).
49. Id. at 94.
50. Id. at 96.
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home which led to treatment.5' The first investigator, however, decided
more investigation was needed and contacted another investigator, who
was a social worker in the Child Protective Services Unit. 2 As a result
of that investigator's interview, seven days before diagnosis and treat-
ment, the child received further medical assistance. The investigator
also made an appointment for the child to see a sexual abuse specialist at
a medical center and a pediatrician. 3
In State v. Hinnant, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to
decide whether a statement made by a child sexual abuse victim to a
clinical psychologist is admissible under its medical diagnosis hearsay
exception. 4 Here, the clinical psychologist specialized in child sexual
abuse cases and was aiding the examining physician in a follow-up
examination. Using an anatomically correct doll, the psychologist
asked the child whether anyone had touched her vagina as well as other
leading questions.56 The court found that not only is the doctor's intent
important, but the child declarant's intent is also important. 7 Therefore,
a court needs to find that the declarant had a motive to tell the truth to
the doctor where treatment depends on it; however, if a treatment motive
is not present, then the statement of the declarant is not so reliable. 8
Therefore, it must be affirmatively established that the declarant had the
requisite intent by demonstrating that the declarant made the statements
understanding that they would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment. 9
Furthermore, the court found that a trial court should consider all
objective circumstances in the record surrounding the declarant's state-
ments in determining whether the declarant possessed the requisite
intent.6° Upon examining the record and the transcript, the court found
no evidence that the child understood the psychologist was interviewing
her for medical diagnosis or treatment.6' Because the record demon-
strated that the interview was conducted in a child size playroom, and
that the child received no explanation of the purpose of interview, the
court could not conclude that the setting reinforced a need to give truth-
ful answers.62
51. Id.at 98.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id.
54. See State v. Hinnant, 523 S.E.2d 663, 667 (N.C. 2000).
55. Id. at 666.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 669.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 670.
61. Id. at 671.
62. Id.
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Michigan courts also admit hearsay statements regarding the iden-
tity of an abuser under their medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay
rule.63 Michigan courts hold that the trustworthiness of a child's state-
ment must be more rigorously evaluated than an adult's statement
because the court must be sure that the child understood the need to be
truthful to the physician.64 Michigan courts use a version of the Idaho v.
Wright totality of circumstances test in determining the trustworthiness
of a child's statement.65 For example, the use of leading questions may
undermine the trustworthiness of a statement, childlike terminology may
be evidence of genuineness, prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the
examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment, the time of the examination in relation to the trial might indicate
that the child is still suffering from pain and distress, the timing of the
examination in relation to trial might involve the purpose of the exami-
nation, the relation of the child to the abuser would be evidence that the
child did not mistake identity, and the existence or lack of a motive to
fabricate.
Contrary to Idaho v. Wright, the Michigan court held that the relia-
bility of a hearsay statement is strengthened when it is supported by
other evidence, such as corroborating physical evidence of the assault,
evidence that the person identified as the assailant had the opportunity to
commit the assault, and resulting diagnosis and treatment. 66 Such cor-
roborating evidence can support the trustworthiness of the child's state-
ments regarding a sexual assault and aid in the determination of whether
the statement was made for the purpose of receiving medical care.67
The court also held that this corroborative evidence may aid in
admitting the statement under the hearsay exception, even where it
might not be clear whether the child understood that the statement must
be truthful in order to receive proper diagnosis or treatment. 68 The
Meeboer court found that a statement of identity would be reasonably
necessary for diagnosis and treatment in the case of a child who con-
tracts a sexually transmitted disease, or a child who becomes pregnant
by a family member. Thus, the identity of the assailant should be con-
sidered as part of the physician's diagnosis and treatment because it
allows the physician to structure the examination and questions to the
63. People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Mich. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990) (looking at the totality of the circumstances, a
court may take into consideration many of the facets surrounding the statement); see also
Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 626.
66. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 627.
67. Id. at 627-28.
68. Id. at 628.
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exact type of trauma the child recently experienced. By doing this, a
physician can prescribe treatment such as psychological treatment, espe-
cially where the abuser is a member of the child's home and the child
should not be returning to that home.6 9
Some states admit statements made to social workers and psycholo-
gists by sexually abused children under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception.7 ° In Connecticut, when a hearsay statement regarding the
identity of a perpetrator is presented in a case involving child sexual
abuse in the home, those statements made to a physician, psychologist,
or psychiatrist are admissible under their medical diagnosis hearsay
exception because it is reasonably pertinent to treatment in order to pre-
vent future recurrences.7 ' In State v. Cruz, 72 the court found that a
statement made to a social worker by a child, who had been sexually
abused by the mother's live-in boyfriend, fell within the parameters of
their medical diagnosis hearsay exception.73 Although the social worker
was not a physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist, and no doctor relied
on her interview of the victim for treatment purposes, the court held that
because the victim believed the social worker was a doctor, the social
worker fell within Connecticut's definition of "medical" personnel.74 In
Connecticut, when statements by the victim are not made to a physician
directly, but instead they are made to someone in the chain of the medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment, and the declarant's motive is consistent with
the purposes of obtaining medical treatment, the statement is
admissible.75
Texas also allows statements to come in under the medical diagno-
69. Id. at 629.
70. State v. Tornqusit, 600 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Iowa 1999) (finding that the identification of
the abuser made by a child to a mental health counselor during counseling sessions admissible
under IOWA R. EvID. 803(4) because the source of the post traumatic stress disorder suffered by
the child assisted in the diagnosis or treatment of the disorder.); State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W. 2d
167, 169 (Iowa 1998) (finding statements made by a child to a social worker admissible under
IowA R. EVID. 803(4) because the statements were made in connection with diagnosis and
treatment of emotional trauma only if the social worker is sufficiently qualified by training and
experience to provide that diagnosis and treatment); State v. Jones, No. 75390, 1999 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6268, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999) (looking to the function of the social worker to
determine whether the victim's statement could be interpreted as being for diagnosis or treatment.
Therefore, statements made by child to a social worker who was part of an emergency room team
admissible under O1Ho R. EVID. 803(4) because her duty on the job included a psycho-social
assessment by taking a history and determining the type of services needed for the child).
71. State v. Cruz, 746 A.2d 196, 199 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (citing State v. Maldonado, 536
A.2d 600, 603 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988)).
72. Id. at 196.
73. Id. at 200.
74. Id.
75. State v. Maldonado, 536 A. 2d 600, 603 n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
2001]
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sis hearsay exception. In Bearden v. State,7 6 the court admitted the child
victim's statements to a psychologist indentifying the abuser under the
medical diagnosis/treatment hearsay exception.77 At the time of trial,
the child complaintant was seventeen.78 The first instance of abuse
occurred when the child was eight and was discovered when she told a
teacher that she was sexually abused by her father. 79 The charges were
dropped, and the child was returned home, when the father threatened
the child and the mother.8" The child was abused again at age twelve
and, at age seventeen, the child finally confided in a cousin and told the
police. 8 It was also found that several other female relatives were also
abused by him. Bearden is a prime example of the consequences suf-
fered by a child who is returned to an abusive home, and what may
happen to others who come in contact with an abuser who is not prose-
cuted. This case demonstrates that the identity of the abuser is pertinent
to medical diagnosis and further that part of the treatment for the child is
removing the child from the abusive home.
In an Ohio case, State v. Dever,82 statements made by a child dur-
ing a medical examination identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse
were admissible under Ohio's medical diagnosis hearsay exception.83
The court recognized that a young child would probably not personally
seek medical treatment, but would generally be directed to treatment by
an adult. However, the Ohio Supreme Court did not find that a child's
statements relating to medical personel were always untrustworthy for
that reason alone.84 Once the child was at the doctor's office, the
probability of understanding the significance of the visit is heightened
and the motivation for diagnosis and treatment will normally be pre-
sent.85 While the initial desire to seek treatment may be absent, the
motivation will certainly arise once the child has been taken to the doc-
tor.86 The Dever court stated that "absent extraordinary circumstances,
the child has no more motivation to lie than an adult would in similar
circumstances. 87
76. No. 05-97-01550CR, 05-97-01556CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5486 (Tex. App. July 26,
1999).
77. Id. at *16.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *4-5.
81. Id. at *7.
82. State v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio 1992).
83. Id. at 449.
84. Id. at 445.
85. Id. at 443-44.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 444.
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Everyday experience tells us that most children know that if they
do not tell the truth to the person treating them medically, they may get
worse instead of better. An overly strict motivational requirement for
the statements of young children in the context of statements made to
medical personel will almost always keep those statements out of evi-
dence. That is not an acceptable balance of competing interests.
Rather, when an examination of the surrounding circumstances
casts little doubt on the motivation of the child, it is permissible to
assume that the factors underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) are
present. The statement identifying a perpetrator of sexual abuse assists
the doctor to treat any actual injuries the child may have, to prevent
future abuse of the child, and to assess the emotional and psychological
impact of the abuse on the child. The questioning of the complaining
child is important in determining the extent of any abuse, the possibility
of continued exposure to the abuser, and the possibility of the presence
of sexually transmitted diseases. The identity of the perpetrator is par-
ticularly relevant to those inquiries, as well as to the psychological
effects on the child. Treating the child for abuse by a father is different
than treating the child for abuse by a stranger.
As most state courts have noted, the policy behind the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception will not be subverted if the trial court deter-
mines that the following factors are present: (1) the child making the
statement understood the reason why he was at the doctor; and (2) the
doctor relies on his statement to remove him from the home to prevent
further abuse and to psychologically treat the child for this trauma.
Alternatively, the trial court may look at the totality of circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement to determine whether the child
understood the need to tell the truth. Once the child understands that the
doctor needs truthful answers so that the child get help, the child's state-
ments will be inherently trustworthy, as envisioned under the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception.
III. FLORIDA'S STATUTORY CHILD ABUSE HEARSAY EXCEPTION,
§ 90.803(23)
Section 90.803(23)88 was enacted in 1985 by the Florida Legisla-
ture in an attempt to balance the need for protecting children against the
rights of the accused.89 At the time the Florida Legislature was consid-
ering section 90.803(23), the bill also expanded the excited utterance
and medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions to include children specifi-
cally. However, in its final form, the bill did not provide these expan-
88. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985).
89. See Act effective May 30, 1985, § 4, ch. 85-53, 1985 Fla. Laws 140, 141-42.
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sions.9° In reaching its decision in State v. Jones, the Florida Supreme
Court relied heavily on this fact.9 Just because the Florida Legislature
considered expansion and did not include it in the final bill does not
mean that they disapprove of admitting statements under the medical
diagnosis exception. The legislators might have felt that they could not
decide what was a reliable statement under this exception or might have
decided to leave it to judges' discretion to determine what constitutes a
reliable out-of-court statement made by a sexually abused child to a doc-
tor identifying the abuser. Most states and the federal government have
not amended their medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions to specifically
include children, but judges have taken the initiative to interpret their
medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions as including children's statements
of identification.
Perez v. State was one of the first cases to interpret section
90.803(23) and hold it constitutional under both the United States Con-
stitution and the Florida Constitution. 92 Under Perez, the defendant
argued that the statements the child made to her mother, an officer, and a
detective were inadmissible hearsay, and that section 90.803(23) was
unconstitutional because it violated his Sixth Amendment right to con-
front and cross-examine an adverse witness.93 The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing, as required by the statute, and found that the child's
out-of-court statements were reliable, but that the child was unavailable
as a witness because testifying would likely severely traumatize the
child emotionally and mentally.94 Citing Ohio v. Roberts, the Florida
Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment reflects the preference
that a witness be available at trial so that the witness may be cross-
examined. However, if the witness is found to be unavailable, then
those out-of-court statements may come in under a hearsay exception.
According to Ohio v. Roberts, an out-of-court statement is reliable under
the Confrontation Clause if it is admissible under a "firmly rooted hear-
say exception."96 Otherwise, there must be a finding that the statement
has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" as demonstrated by
90. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, HB 874 (1985) Staff Analysis 1-2 (May 4, 1985 and
final May 11, 1985); FLA. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY-CIV., SB 290 (1985) Staff Analysis 1-3 (April
2, 1985 and rev. May 1, 1985).
91. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 825-26 (Fla. 1993) ("The proposed expansion of existing
hearsay exception were removed after discussion, and lawmakers chose instead the more balanced
new hearsay exception codified in section 90.803(23)") (citations omitted).
92. 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
93. Id. at 208.
94. Id. at 207-08.
95. Id. at 208 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1979)).
96. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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Idaho v. Wright.97
The court compared the nature of the exception in section
90.803(23) against the standard set in Roberts.98 In accordance with
Roberts, the court under section 90.803(23) must hold a hearing to
decide whether the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient safeguards of reliability.99 The Florida Supreme
Court found that these requirements met both the federal and Florida
constitution and, therefore, section 90.803(23) was constitutional.'0 ° In
a more recent case, the Florida District Court of Appeal had to decide if
statements by child victims of sexual abuse could only be admitted
under section 90. 803(23) and, therefore, the statute would preempt any
other hearsay exception.101 In Doe v. Broward County Scool Board &
YMCA, the court found that Jones stands for the proposition that under
the medical diagnosis hearsay exception, identity of the perpetrator is
not admissible.10 Jones, however, did not mandate or suggest that sec-
tion 90.803(23) is the only hearsay exception that can be applied to a
child victim's out-of-court statements. 0 3  Ultimately, the Doe court
reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the statements
made to the psychologist by the child regarding her sexual abuse, but not
relating to the abuser's identity, were admissible under the medical diag-
nosis hearsay exception."m
A. Reliability and Unavailability
A year after the Jones decision, the Florida Supreme Court in State
v. Townsend'0 5 was asked to determine if a finding of incompetency
because one is unable to recognize the duty to tell the truth, satisfies the
unavailability requirement of section 90.803(23)(a)(2)." 6 Townsend
challenged the availablity of his daughter, who was two at the time of
the abuse and when she made statements to her mother about the alleged
abuse.'0 7 Under section 90.803(23), two reliability requirements had to
be met before hearsay statements could be admitted under the statute.
97. Perez, 536 So. 2d at 209.
98. Id.
99. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(1) (2000).
100. Perez, 536 So. 2d at 209.
101. Doe v. Broward County Sch. Bd. and YMCA, 744 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999).
102. Id. at 1072.
103. Id. at 1072-73. For example, a statement can come in under section 90.801(2)(b), Florida
Statutes, as a prior consistent statement. Id at 1073 n.3; see also Jones, 625 So. 2d at 826.
104. Doe, 774 So. 2d at 1073.
105. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
106. Id. at 952.
107. Id.
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First, the source of the information through which the statement was
reported must indicate trustworthiness.' 8 Second, the time, content, and
circumstances surrounding the statement must reflect that the statement
provides safeguards of reliability. 10 9 The reason for the first require-
ment is to insure that the source is examined to determine that the state-
ment has a clear showing of reliability. 10 For example, if the parents
are going through a divorce, the child's statement might be influenced
by an angry spouse telling the child what to say.i"'
In order to be unavailable under section 90.803(23), the trial court
must find, according to expert testimony, that there is a substantial like-
lihood that the child would suffer severe emotional or mental harm if the
child testifies, or the court finds that the child satisfies one of the defini-
tions under section 90.804(1), Florida Statutes.112  In determining
whether or not the child is competent to testify, factors that may be taken
into account in Florida are: (1) whether the child is capable of observing
and recollecting facts; (2) whether the child is capable of narrating those
facts to the court or to a jury; and (3) whether the child has a moral sense
of the obligation to tell the truth. 1 3 If the court determines that the child
is unavailable, then other corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense,
which have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, must accom-
pany the child's out-of-court statement. 114
Moreover, in Perez, the Florida Supreme Court stated that even
though a child might not understand the duty to tell the truth as a wit-
ness, that alone did not rule out the statement as unreliable because the
court must first analyze whether the statement is reliable." 5 Townshend
was different because it focused on whether the test for incompetence
fell within the definition of "unavailable" under section 90.803(23). The
108. Id. at 954 (citing Weatherford v. State, 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id. (citing CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 803(23), at 652 (1993 ed.)).
112. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.804(1) (2000) states:
A witness is unavailable for purposes of admitting a hearsay statement if the
witness: (a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; (b) Persists in refusing to
testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to
do so; (c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement so as
to destroy his effectiveness as a witness during the trial; (d) Is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or because of then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity; or (e) Is absent form the hearing, and the proponent if his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance or testimony by process or
other reasonable means.
113. Griffin v. State, 526 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
114. Id.
115. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 211 (Fla. 1988).
[Vol. 55:533
WON OR LOST THE BATTLE
court found in Townsend that the child could be incompetent at the time
he said the statement under section 90.803(23).116 The court held that
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness ensured the reliability of
a statement, not the competency of the witness making the statement.
1 7
Townsend's next argument was that section 90.803(23) was uncon-
stitutional because it violated the Confrontation Clause. Although this
issue had already been decided in Perez, the Supreme Court decided
Idaho v. Wright"8 after that case, and Townsend believed that it
reversed the decision in Perez." 9 In Wright, the Supreme Court decided
that in looking at the sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness of an out-
of-court statement, a court had to look at the totality of circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement.' 20 Other corroborative evi-
dence, however, could not be used in determining whether the statement
was reliable.'21
The Florida Supreme Court found that Perez and Wright were not
in conflict because section 90.803(23) still requires that the hearsay evi-
dence be determined to be reliable before being admitted.'22 Section
90.803(23), however, further requires that corroborating evidence exist,
supporting the reliability of the hearsay statement. 2 3 To resolve any
questions about inconsistency between section 90.803(23) and Perez, the
court announced a new procedure: the trial judge must first find that the
hearsay statement is reliable, and the source is trustworthy, without
regard to the corroborating evidence.Y2 4 If the first condition is met,
then the trial judge must look at the corroborating evidence. 25 If either
condition is not met, then the hearsay statement will not be admitted.'2 6
Townsend's final argument was that the trial court admitted state-
ments under the statutory procedure that were not reliable. The Florida
Supreme Court announced that there were other facts a court could take
into account when determining whether an out-of-court statement was
trustworthy such as:
[A] consideration of the statement's spontaneity, whether the state-
ment was made at the first available opportunity following the
alleged incident; whether the statement was elicited in response to
116. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 956.
117. Id. at 955.
118. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
119. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 956.
120. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
121. Id. at 822-23.
122. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 956-57.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 957.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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questions from adults; the mental state of the child when the abuse
was reported; whether the statement consisted of a child-like descrip-
tion of the act; whether the child used terminology unexpected of a
child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof to fabricate the state-
ment; the ability of the child to distinguish between reality and fan-
tasy; the vagueness of the accusations; the possibility of any improper
influence on the accusation.' 27
In Doe v. Broward County School Board and YMCA, the judge
relied on the mother's testimony that she did not want the child to testify
and a report from the psychologist who evaluated the child to determine
the child was unavailable to testify.1 28 Similarly, in Perez, the court
stated that the trial judge did not to have to examine the child in order to
determine if the child is competent to testify. 29 A representative from a
mental heath association testified to the effects of having a child testify
in court, and after evaluating the child, she thought it would cause severe
emotional and psychological harm.' 30 The court also heard testimony
from the mother stating that the child would suffer mental and emotional
distress if he had to testify. 3 ' In the concurrence, however, Justice
Overton made it clear that he felt that the judge should meet with the
child in camera in order to evaluate the child's statements. 32
B. Out-of-Court Statement Confliting With In-court Testimony
In Department of Death and Rehabilitation v. M. B., the Florida
Supreme Court held that a child's out-of-court statement can be admitted
if it passes the requirements of section 90.803(23), even when the out-
of-court statement conflicts with the child's in-court testimony.'33 An
eight-year-old girl repeated to her third grade teacher, a guidance coun-
selor, a Child Protection Team ("CPT") coordinator, a CPT nurse practi-
tioner, and a clinical psychologist on referral from the CPT that her
stepfather had sexual intercourse with her. 134 At the trial to remove her
from her home, the child testified that she did not know who abused her,
even though she had been sexually abused. 135 The trial court made case-
specific findings that the statements made by the child prior to the hear-
ing were reliable under section 90.803(23).136 The court's policy behind
127. Id. at 957-58.
128. 744 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
129. See Perez, 536 So. 2d at 211.
130. Id. at 210.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 212.
133. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. M.B., 701 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1997).
134. Id. at 1156.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1157.
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agreeing with the trial court that these prior statements were admissible,
was that childrens' statements are usually more reliable when made
closer to the event, rather than when time has passed and the pressures
of testifying in court might affect the answer. 137 The court reiterated its
findings in Jones and Townsend, and stated that once reliability had been
determined under the strict standards of section 90.803(23), then the
statement could come in as substantive evidence. 38 The court con-
cluded that a statement need not be consistent with the in-court testi-
mony as long as the out-of-court testimony had undergone section
90.803(23) analysis. 139
C. Other Corroborative Evidence
Florida courts have tried to define what "other sufficient corrobora-
tive evidence" may include. In Reyner v. State, a police officer testified
as to statements made by a defendant after his arrest, and the issue on
appeal was whether the police officer's statement was admissible as cor-
roborative evidence.' 4° According to the police, after the arrest the
defendant said that while he and his niece were on the bed, and after
they tickled each other, they both fell asleep, and she had snuggled
under the covers closer to him. 4 ' The defendant stated that he was
wearing open fly boxers, so it was possible that when he was sleeping on
his side, his penis could have fallen out. 142 The court found that the
statement made to the police was also enough to corroborate the child's
statement to her father that she and the defendant had taken a nap,
shared the same bed, played at his house, and the possibility that she
could have seen his penis. 4
3
The First District Court of Appeal held in Jones v. State that cor-
roborative evidence under section 90.803(23) does not even have to
come from the same case." 4 Jones argued that the section 90.803(23)
plainly stated that corroborative evidence had to come from the actual
case on trial. 145 The court rejected this argument because a Florida
Supreme Court case had already held that similar fact evidence from
another crime may be used to satisfy the "other corroborative evidence
of the abuse or offense."' 146
137. See id. at 1161.
138. Id. at 1162.
139. Id.
140. 745 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. Ist DCA 1999).
141. Id. at 1073.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Jones v. State, 728 So. 2d 788, 790-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
145. Id. at 790.
146. Id. at 791 (citing State v. Rawls, 649 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1994)).
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D. Other States' Child Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception
Many states have adopted special hearsay exceptions for child sex-
ual abuse victims similar to section 90.803(23), although many of those
states do not preclude the use of the medical diagnosis hearsay excep-
tion. 47 For example, in State v. Cole, where statements made by a
three-year-old to a police officer and a foster parent were admissible
under its child abuse hearsay exception, section 595.02(m)(3), Minne-
sota Statutes, as well as a statement made to a physician, which under
Minnesota Rule Evidence 803(4) was admissable as an statement made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. 148 In a Washington
case, State v. Lopez, three siblings made statements regarding abuse to a
social worker.'49 To determine whether there had actually been sexual
abuse, the trial court admitted the children's statements under both the
medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule 50 and the statutory child
sexual abuse hearsay exception.' 5 ' The appellate court found that the
147. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.100 (Michie 2000) as construed in State v. Nollner, 749 P.2d 905
(Ak. App. 1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1416 (2000) as construed in State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d
801, 802 (Ariz. 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-10 (Michie. 2000) as construed in Clausen v.
State, 901 S.W.2d 35, 37-8 (Ark. 1995); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1360 (West 2001) as construed in
People v. Brodit, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129
(2000) as construed in People v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1088-89 (Colo. 1989); DEL. CODE
tit. 11, § 3513 (2000) as construed in Jones v. State, 599 A.2d 413 (Del. 1991); 725 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. 5/115-10 (2000) as construed in People v. Falaster, 670 N.E.2d 624, 628-31 (III. 1996);
BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (2000) as construed in Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140
(Ind. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie. 2001) as construed in Edwards v.
Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Ky. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (2000) as
construed in In re Rachel T., 549 A.2d 27 (Md. Court. Spec. App. 1988); MINN. STAT.
§ 260C.165 (2000) as construed in State v. Salazar, 504 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (2000) as construed in Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1995); OHIO
R. EVID. 807 (Anderson 2000) as construed in State v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio 1992); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (2000) as construed in Kennedy v. State, 839 P.2d 667 (Okl. Crim. App.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (2000) as construed
in State v. Florczak, 882 P.2d 199 (Wash. App. 1994).
148. 594 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
149. 980 P.2d 224, 226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
150. Id. at 225; WASH. R. EvID. 803(4) provides an exception for statements made for the
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
151. Lopez, 980 P.2d at 225. In Washington, out-of-court statements describing child sexual
abuse are admissable if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:
a. Testifies at the proceedings; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that when the child is unavailable as a
witness, such a statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative
evidence of the act. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that
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statements did not fall under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
because the statements were made to a social worker who only served an
investigative purpose for the prosecution in order to prepare for trial and
there was no evidence that the children understood that their statements
would further medical diagnosis or treatment.1 52 The court, however,
determined that those same statements could come under the statutory
exception for child sexual abuse cases because all the reliability require-
ments had been met. 153
The leading case that addresses the question of what constitutes
adequate liability is State v. Ryan. In Ryan, the Washington Supreme
Court adopted a set of factors for determining the reliability of out-of-
court declarations: (1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie; (2) the
general character of the declarant; (3) whether more than one person
heard the statements; (4) whether the statements were made spontane-
ously; and (5) the timing of the declaration and the relationship between
the declarant and the witness. 154 Using the Ryan test, the court in Lopez
admitted the children's statement because there was no evidence that the
children had a motive to lie and no evidence that the children had a
reputation for not telling the truth.' 55 The children made similar state-
ments to their mother, police, and the social worker and although some
of the children told different versions, the statements were similar
enough. 15 6 The children's statements were spontaneous, as they volun-
teered the information themselves and did not offer the information only
after leading or suggestive questions had been asked.15 Also, the chil-
dren made the statements in an environment that allowed them to speak
candidly to a professional trained in interviewing sexually abused chil-
the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a
substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to
findings pursuant to section 90.904(1)
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later that 10 days
before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception
pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice
shall include a written statements of the content of the child's statement, the
time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the
statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as
necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis
for its ruling under this subsection.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (2000).
152. Lopez, 980 P.2d at 228.
153. Id. at 232.
154. Id. at 229 (citing State v. Ryan, 691 P. 2d 197 (Wash. 1984)).
155. Id. at 229.
156. Id. at 229-30.
157. Id. at 230.
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dren, thereby enhancing the reliability of the statements.' 58 Plus, the
children were eight and nine when they made the statements to the social
worker and, therefore, even though some of the details are missing, they
were old enough to remember what had happened to them. 5 9
The state of Texas has a statute that allows statements made by
sexually abused children to the out cry witness (i.e. the first person the
child told about the abuse) to be admitted into evidence.' 60 In Foreman
v. State,16' a child that was participating in a program for children with
behavioral problems told a counselor that she had been molested by an
uncle a couple of years earlier. 162 The defendant argued that the child's
mother and the step-father had been the first outcry witnesses, and there-
fore, the counselor's testimony regarding the child's out-of-court state-
ment should not be admitted. 163 The child testified that the first people
she told were her mother and stepfather, but neither of them remembered
this because when the child told them about the incident, they were both
under the influence of drugs. 164
Foreman was a case of first impression. The court had never been
presented with the question of who was the first outcry witness when the
first people the child told cannot remember the child making the state-
ment. 165 In beginning its analysis, the court began by stating, "[t]he out-
cry witness must be the first person, 18 years old or older, to whom the
child makes a statement that in some discernible manner describes the
alleged offense."' 166 The Texas legislature, in picking the first person to
which a child makes these statements, tried to strike a balance between
the general prohibition against hearsay statements and effective prosecu-
tion of child sexual abuse cases. 167 The court interpreted the statute as
meaning the first person "to remember and relate at trial the child's
statement that in some discernable manner describes the alleged
offenses."' 168 Therefore, the counselor was allowed to testify to these
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 38.072 (2001). The code states in pertinent part:
This article applies only to statements that describe the alleged offense that:
(1) were made by the child against whom the offense was allegedly committed; and
(2) were made to the first person, 18 years of age or older, other that the defendant,
to whom the child made a statement about the offense.
Id. at §2(a)(2).
161. 995 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex Crim. App. 1999).
162. Id. at 855.
163. Id. at 857.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 858 (quoting Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 859.
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statements because the counselor was the only person who remembered
and related the facts of the alleged abuse from the the child's
statements. 169
California has both a specially tailored medical diagnosis hearsay
exception for sexually abused children that applies both in civil and
criminal cases and a child abuse hearsay exception.1 70 In People v.
Brodit,1 71 the defendant argued that these excpetions were unconstitu-
tional because it only benefited the prosecution. 172 The court disagreed,
finding that these new sections specify a further limited exception to the
general hearsay exclusionary rule, giving the state a new tool in which to
prosecute these cases. 173 The California court, following the federal
courts, found that the statements made in the course of a child sexual
abuse examination to a nurse and a therapist describing the nature and
circumstances of sexual abuse are admissible under the new rule, as they
are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 174 The court held that
a hearsay statement, identifying the sexual abuser who is a member of
the victim's family or household, is admissible where the abuser has
such an intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser's identity
becomes reasonably pertinent to the victim's proper treatment. 175 The
court recognized that sexual abuse victims need emotional and mental
treatment, and a doctor might need to know who the abuser is in order to
render proper treatment. 176
All the above-mentioned states recognize that a statement made by
a child to a doctor constitues a wholly different situation than one cov-
ered by the traditional medical diagnosis exception, and therefore both
are needed. The conflict inherent in the Florida Supreme Court's opin-
ion in State v. Jones is that the court is assuming that the statements that
may have been admitted under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
will overlap with statements that may be admitted under section
90.803(23). On the contrary, the two exceptions are inherently different.
Statements coming in under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception are
admitted for the circumstances surrounding them. When a child goes to
a doctor or therapist, it is the beginning of the treatment process. If the
child understands that the doctor is there to help him, then the state-
169. Id.
170. CAL. Evro. Code § 1253 (2001) (medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1360 (2001) (child abuse hearsay exception).
171. People v. Brodit, 72 Cal. Reptr. 2d 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
172. Id. at 161.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 164.
175. Id. at 165.
176. Id.
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ment's reliability is assured because a child will not lie if his treatment
depends on what he tells the doctor.
IV. A LOOK AT FEDERAL CASES
Most child sexual abuse cases are decided in state courts because
each state has its own law regarding this issue. Although the number of
federal cases on this issue is small, these federal cases serve as guidance
for state courts. Under cases such as Maryland v. Craig, the United
States Supreme Court has found a strong public interest in protecting
children and, in certain instances such as child sexual abuse, dispensing
with confrontation at trial may be warranted.177 As Justice O'Connor
stated, "[o]ur precedents confirm that a defendant's right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face to face
confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is neces-
sary to further an important public policy and only where reliability of
the testimony is otherwise assured." '178
In Idaho v. Wright, a landmark case, the federal court faced the
question of whether statements made by a child to a pediatrician violated
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 7 9 The
Supreme Court of Idaho found that the pediatrician used leading ques-
tions and had a preconceived idea of what the child was going to say,
and therefore, the child's statements were unreliable and inadmissible
under its residual hearsay exception. 18° The United States Supreme
Court affirmed and established the rule that particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness of the child's statement should be based on a considera-
tion of the totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding the making
of the statements that render the declarant worthy of belief. 8 '
State and federal courts have identified a number of factors that
relate to whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child
sexual abuse cases are reliable; including spontaneity and consistent rep-
etition, the mental state of the declarant, the use of terminology unex-
pected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate. 182 The
Idaho court made it clear that the presence of evidence tending to cor-
roborate the truth of the statement would be no substitute for cross-
examination because hearsay used to convict a defendant should be reli-
able by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, and not by reference to
177. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
178. Id. at 850.
179. 497 U.S. 805, 808 (1990).
180. Id. at 812.
181. Id. at 819.
182. Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
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other evidence at trial. 83
In some cases, it has been argued that the rationale behind Rule
803(4) is absent when dealing with a child's statement because the child
does not completely understand the need to tell the truth. In United
States v. Pacheco, a doctor on a child sexual abuse team, testified as to
the child's identification of her abuser and what the abuser had done.1 84
The defendant argued that due to the young age of the child, there was
no evidence that the child understood the need to tell the truth or that she
was speaking with a doctor who was there to help with her diagnosis and
treatment. 185 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and cited to
United States v. Norman T.,186 which had already established that there
was no basis for the argument that the age of a child would affect the
understanding that a trained medical professional was there to treat or
diagnosis the child.187 The court found that the doctor explained to the
child the purpose of her visit. 8 8 The defendant then tried to argue that
the identification was not admissible because he was not an immediate
member of the child's household. 89 The court refused to so narrowly
define "household" and found that the child spent enough time over at
the defendant's home, and was actually present at the defendant's home
when the abuse occurred.19 0
In United States v. Sumner, 9' the Eighth Circuit reversed a convic-
tion for abusive sexual contact and aggravated sexual abuse of a child
because the psychologist did not discuss with the child the need to be
truthful. So therefore, there was no evidence that the child understood
that admitting the identity of the abuser would aid in her treatment, and
whether the child was aware that the doctor was a psychologist. 92 The
young girl had actually told a therapist that she had gone to the psychol-
ogist just to talk, and therefore, the court held that she did not under-
stand that the psychologist was there to treat her.193 Once the court
established that the child's statement to the psychologist could not be
admitted under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception, the court
examined the statement itself to determine whether the statement had
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness using the totality of circum-
183. See id. at 826.
184. 154 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 1998).
185. Id. at 1240.
186. 129 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 1104.
188. Pacheco, 154 F.3d at 1241.
189. Id. at 1241-42.
190. Id. at 1241.
191. United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2000).
192. Id. at 1185.
193. Id. at 1186.
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stances standard. The child's statements, however, were mostly in
response to leading questions from the psychologist, so the statement
was not admissable.19
4
In an earlier case, Oleson v. Class,195 the Eighth Circuit held that a
child's statement to a doctor was inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4) because the doctor had not told the five-year-old child
why identifying the abuser was important to her diagnosis and treat-
ment. 96 The doctor only told the child "what was going to happen"
during the physical examination, and never explained why it was impor-
tant for her to tell the truth nor why the questions he was asking were
important to her treatment. 97 When looking at the Ohio v. Roberts and
Idaho v. Wright 98 tests, the court found that the statement did not have
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness because the record showed
that the child only nodded to questions and offered little description or
detail. 199
Federal courts have also deliberated on the question of whether a
family member's statement regarding child abuse to a medical profes-
sional may be admissible under Rule 803(4). In Lovejoy v. United
States,2 °° the mother told the nurse that she saw Lovejoy standing over
her daughter with an erection, the daughter's tee shirt was raised, and
her underwear was lowered. 20 ' The court found that this statement
could be admitted under the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
because this information, "would aid the medical professionals examin-
ing the victim 'by pinpointing areas of the body to be examined more
closely and by narrowing the examination by eliminating other
areas.' "202
V. THE CONCLUSION
Under State v. Jones, the Florida Supreme Court tried to balance
two competing interests: (1) the right of the accused to confront his wit-
nesses against him; and (2) effective prosecution of child sexual abuse
cases. The court found that the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
would be stretched too far if it applied to child sexual abuse cases
allowing the admission of statements of identity because it would evis-
194. Id.; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
195. Oleson v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999).
196. Id. at 1098.
197. Id.; see also United States v. Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1999).
198. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
199. Oleson, 164 F.3d at 1099.
200. Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996).
201. Id. at 631-32.
202. Id. at 632 (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (1981)).
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cerate the rationale for the medical diagnosis exception. As most state
and federal courts have noted, however, the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception is a valuable tool in the fight against child sexual abuse. Most
state and federal courts have agreed that statements of identity in child
sexual abuses cases are admissible under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception because the identity of the abuser is pertinent to medical diag-
nosis or treatment when the abuser is part of the same household or
family. The judges in those states and federal circuits have taken the
initiative to interpret the law and determine whether a child's statement
is reliable when it is admitted under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception. In a jurisdiction that admits statements made by children
under a medical diagnosis hearsay exception, the child most of the time
has not testified and the only people who are testifying to the child's
out-of-court statements are medical personnel who may, by state law,
have a duty to report this kind of abuse.
The Florida Supreme Court stated in Jones: "Clearly, section
90.803(23) is the Florida Legislature's response to the need to establish
special protections for child victims in the judicial system. 2 °3 How-
ever, by eliminating admissibility of the identity of an abuser under the
medical diagnosis exception, the Jones court has enormously hindered
the fight against child sexual abuse. For example, in Florida if a child is
twelve and is sexually abused, her statements to a doctor may not be
admitted under section 90.803(23) because she is too old. If the state-
ment of identity was admissible under section 90.803(4), however, then
the state can bring her abuser to justice and help the child receive treat-
ment. Without this option, the state is left without an alternative.
Because of the nature of child sexual abuse, often the only direct
witnesses to the crime will be the perpetrator and the victim. Conse-
quently, much of the state's evidence will necessarily be hearsay state-
ments made by the victim to relatives and medical personnel. Florida
courts argue that a child's statement is not reliable because a child may
not understand the importance of being truthful with the doctor, or the
child does not have the same motivation to tell the truth as an adult
because the child has not gone to the doctor on his own volition. It is
the duty of the trial court as set out in Renville, however, to examine the
understanding that the child had as to the purpose of his visit with the
doctor and whether that statement was reliable under section 90.803(4).
The trial court may make findings as to the type of questioning that
was used by the doctor, such as if there was the use of leading questions.
Before admitting a child's statement, the court may examine the intent
behind the child declarant's statements and establish that the child had
203. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1993).
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the requisite intent by demonstrating that the child made the statements
understanding that it would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment.
In child sexual abuse cases, when the doctor asks what happened,
the answer is intertwined with the identity of the abuser. If the abuser is
a family member or someone who is around the child often, the doctor
may need this information to structure the examination and questions to
the exact type of trauma that the child recently experienced, to test for
the possibility of sexually transmitted diseases, and, most importantly, to
take the child out of that environment to prevent future abuse. The doc-
tor must treat the psychological, as well as the physical injuries that arise
from being sexually abused.
Disclosure of the identity of the abuser is especially important in
cases where the abuser is a member of the household because the child
cannot protect himself from an abuser at home. Unlike an adult, a child
cannot escape this situation on his own. The child needs the aid of a
doctor or family member to help the child out of this horrible situation.
After the child has been removed, the child needs extensive emotional
and psychological treatment for the unforgettable injuries that she has
suffered by being sexually abused by a person she should be able to trust
the most.
A sampling of all these federal and state cases show that the job of
the judge is to interpret the law and under the law, the admission of
identity in a child sexual abuse case under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception is not so far fetched an idea. When society and the law have
found that children are to be protected, judges should not defer the task
to someone else and eliminate a valuable tool in the medical diagnosis
hearsay exception to bring violators to justice. As the Florida Supreme
Court noted in Perez v. State, "a child victim's statements are valuable
and trustworthy in part because they exude the naivet6 and curiosity of a
small child, and were made in circumstances very different from interro-
gation or a criminal trial, and therefore are usually irreplaceable as sub-
stantive evidence."2 4 Therefore, a child's statement identifying his
abuser when the abuser is part of the same household or is a family
member should be admissible in Florida under the medical diagnosis
hearsay exception. Every facet of treatment of the abused child, includ-
ing the removal of the child from the abusive environment so that future
abuse is prevented, depends on knowing the identity of the abuser.
CELINA E. CONTRERAS
204. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 209 n.5 (Fla. 1988) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
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